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Red-Teaming NLW: A Top Ten
List of Criticisms about NonLethal Weapons
David A. Koplow

1

Critics of non-lethal weapons (NLW) have asserted
numerous complaints about the concepts, the Department of
Defense research and development efforts, and the pace of
innovation in the field. These critiques challenge the cost of the
programs, their consistency with international law, the adverse
public reaction to some of the devices, and the dangers of
proliferation, among other points. This article summarizes the
various assessments, in form of a “top ten list” of criticisms,
and evaluates their weight. The author concludes that some of
these points of objection have merit, but overall, the NLW
enterprise is worthy of continuation and even expansion, to
meet more fully its ambitious goals.
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I. Introduction
The concept and practice of non-lethal weapons (NLW) is no
longer a new and fledgling enterprise. U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen.
Anthony Zinni’s famous invocation of NLW to assist in covering the
withdrawal of United Nations forces from Somalia occurred way back
in 1995. 2 Directive 3000.3, the foundational charter for the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) engagement in the field, was issued in
1996. 3 The Joint Directorate, the organizational sanctum supporting
the Pentagon’s day-to-day research and development in the field,
stood up in 1997. 4
This makes NLW a twenty-year-old campaign. Measured another
way, 1995 was two or three wars ago. And, of course, many of the
relevant technologies and devices trace their lineage back much
further. Conversely, many other familiar institutions and social
phenomena that modern society considers mature and well established
are younger than NLW. The Toyota Prius, for example, debuted in
1997, 5 as did the first Apple online store. 6 Nintendo released the
Nintendo 64 video game system 1996. 7 Of local interest, the re-birth
of the current Cleveland Browns came in 1999. 8 Even Pokémon,
2.

Dwight Jon Zimmerman, The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, DEF.
MEDIA NETWORK (Dec. 1, 2010), http:// www. defensemedianetwork.
com/stories/the-joint-non-lethal-weapons-program/ (describing Lt. Gen.
Anthony Zinni’s innovative exploitation of NLW in Somalia, to protect
the withdrawal of United Nations personnel without further inciting
local opposition).

3.

DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) and NLW
Policy, DoD Directive 3000.03E (Apr. 25, 2013), originally issued as
Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, DoD Directive 3000.3 (Jul. 9, 1996).

4.

History, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROG., http://
jnlwp.defense.gov/About/History.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).

5.

Toyota Prius 1997-2004, AUTOEVOLUTION, http:// www. autoevolution.
com/ cars/ toyota- prius- 1997. html #aeng_toyota-prius -2000-15
(indicating that the Toyota Prius’s initial introduction was in Japan in
1997, while its global introduction was in 2001) (last visited Mar. 4,
2015).

6.

Daniel Eran Dilger, The next ten years of Apple Retail, APPLEINSIDER
(Jan. 5, 2012, 09:41 AM), http:// appleinsider.com/ articles/ 12/01/
05/the_next_ten_years_of_apple_retail.

7.

Chris Scullion, History of Nintendo: N64, OFFICIAL NINTENDO MAG.
(Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.officialnintendomagazine.co.uk/12769/
features/history-of-nintendo-n64/.

8.

Thomas George, PRO FOOTBALL; The Old Becomes New as Browns
are Reborn, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1999), http:// www.nytimes.com/
1999/08/09/sports/pro-football-the-old-becomes-new-as-browns-arereborn.html.
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unleashed in 1996, is as old as NLW. 9 Thus, it has been long enough
since the birth of NLW that it is now appropriate to undertake some
serious, even skeptical, appraisal of the program and its constituent
elements. The underlying theories and the programmatic features are
now sufficiently strong and well established to be able to endure
tough scrutiny.
One version of that searching analysis is red-teaming, trying to
construct the strongest possible case against NLW, as a form of highstakes testing. As an avid supporter of NLW, I am especially
interested in exploring how well the program—its history, current
status, and anticipated future directions—can stand up to this type of
audit, as well as contemplating what rebuttals to the critiques may be
persuasive. To begin this red-teaming, I have prepared a Top Ten
List of objections, doubts, and concerns about NLW. I hope that a
review of this roster of complaints can inspire a focused, even-handed
appraisal of the overall pros and cons of the NLW enterprise.

II. Non-Lethal Weapons Complaints
1. NLW Technology is Still Largely a Capability in Search of a Mission

To date, there really has been no great demand for NLW.
Customers are not eagerly lining up to procure the products. The
overwhelming function of the military remains “to kill people and
break things,” and if the bad guys continue to shoot live munitions at
us, then the good guys will need to return fire with ordnance that is
as lethal as possible. 10 Both force protection and mission
accomplishment demand the traditional accoutrements of military
operations; NLW will, at best, occupy a boutique niche. Even if
civilians are present—which is the situation in which NLW would
ordinarily be of greatest application—deadly force is typically still
necessary and appropriate as a means of self-defense. The array of
NLW capabilities, present and future, designed to fill a gap “between
bullhorns and bullets,” is basically a solution to a nearly non-existent
problem. Almost always, bullhorns or bullets will be both necessary
and sufficient. 11

9.

See Glenn Rose, Pokémon Is Back, MARLIN CHRONICLE, Oct. 29, 2013,
http://marlinchronicle.vwc.edu//?p=1140.

10.

Bob Wilson, The Purpose of a Military is to Kill People and Break
Things, ETHICAL SPECTACLE, http:// www.spectacle.org/298/ wilmine.
html (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).

11.

See Lt. Col. Jesse Galvan & Maj. Theo Kang, The Future of the Army
Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center, MIL. POLICE, Apr. 2006, at 4, 4,
available at http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/pdfs/pb19-06-1.pdf.
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2. NLW Technology is Developing Too Slowly

Despite the best, and quite admirable, efforts of the Joint NonLethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), the military services, and a
small but growing armada of contractors in the nascent non-lethal
military-industrial complex, there is still not enough there there. The
requisite inventiveness, and the capacity to carry new capabilities into
operation, have been in short supply. As one indicator, the current
JNLWD annual report 12 is remarkably similar to its forebearers from
five or ten years ago in describing the array of currently available
technologies (which are still relatively modest) and in forecasting the
more adventuresome future systems (which are seemingly not getting
much closer to operability.) Some of the fact sheets, describing
particular types of NLW programs, likewise reflect only incremental
year-to-year editing, conveying a distressing suggestion that progress
in NLW occurs at only a glacial pace. 13
As an example of this perceived lethargy in development, there is
currently no NLW that can effectively but safely address problems
with groups of people at a distance of more than a few meters. Blunt
trauma projectiles, tasers, and vehicle-arresting barriers are fine, but
if these are the only products to come out of the creativity of the
NLW sector, then the game is not changing fast enough. Perhaps this
is a case of simply getting what you pay for. When the budget for
NLW programs hovers around $140 million annually, a paltry sum by

12.

Compare U.S. DEF. DEP’T, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS ANNUAL REVIEW 6
(2013) [hereinafter JNLWD 2013 REV.], available at http://
jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Annual_Review
s_Reports/2013/DoD_Non-Lethal_ Weapons_ Program_Annual_
Review_11.19.2012_HTML_format_v1.pdf (describing “[l]ow-energy
dazzling lasers” as current technology in 2013 providing “discrete, nonverbal hailing and warning signals.” with U.S. DEF. DEP’T, NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS ANNUAL REVIEW 10 (2010), available at http:// jnlwp.defense.
gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Annual_Reviews_Reports/20
10_2011/2010_Annual_Report_Final_PDF.pdf (describing “dazzling
lasers” as current technology in 2011 providing “discrete, non-verbal
warning signals”), and Staff Sgt. Will Skelton, Active Denial System
Demonstrated for Department of Defense Leadership and News Media,
U.S. DEP’T DEF. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM NEWSL. (Joint NonLethal Weapons Dir. Quantico, Va.), June 2012, at 4, available at
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Newslett
ers/Newsletter_053112.pdf (describing the Active Denial System as a
millimeter-wave system as the system of the future).

13.

See Non-Lethal Weapons Requirements Fact Sheet, JOINT NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS PROG. (Oct. 2011), http://jnlwp.defense.gov/ Portals/50/
Documents/Press_Room/Fact_Sheets/NLWR_Fact_Sheet_Oct_2011.
pdf (describing the need for, and progress in, non-lethal weapons
development).
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Pentagon standards, NLW will not experience many revolutionary
advances. 14
3. Public Opinion, in the United States and Elsewhere, Has Not Warmed
to NLW

The most interesting and promising development among NLW is
the Active Denial System (ADS), a novel millimeter “heat wave”
mechanism for dispersing crowds at standoff distances. 15 This device
carries enormous potential for constructive application in all sorts of
mixed civilian and military situations; it really would be something
new under the sun. 16 ADS was incrementally developed and
thoroughly tested over a period of a decade; it is a proven
technology. 17 DoD deployed ADS to Afghanistan, but never used it.18
Why not? Was it because the administrators feared that the media
coverage of its use would make it look too inhumane, too futuristic,
too scary, or just too weird? If so, that is a terrible, but perhaps
representative, illustration of excessive timidity surrounding the
employment of new technologies that might provoke adverse public
reactions. Sometimes, as with remotely piloted vehicles (weaponized
drones) and stealth technology, for example, DoD has been willing to
pay the price of that “CNN effect”; 19 but, thus far, DoD has not
expressed a similar assertiveness when it comes to NLW.
14.

JNLWD 2013 REV., supra note 11, at 4.

15.

Active Denial Technology Fact Sheet, U.S. DEF. DEP’T NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS PROG. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://jnlwp. defense. gov/PressRoom
/FactSheets/ArticleView/tabid/4782/Article/4047/active-denialtechnology-fact-sheet.aspx.

16.

See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, Pain Ray, Rejected by the Military, Ready
to Blast L.A. Prisoners, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2010, 3:02 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2010/08/pain-ray-rejected-by-the-military-readyto-blast-l-a-prisoners/ (describing how and why the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department purchased ADS systems brought back from
Afghanistan for crowd control use in at least one LACSD detention
center).

17.

See Brian Bergstein, Military’s Energy-Beam Weapons Delayed, USA
TODAY (Jul. 9, 2005), http:// usatoday30.usatoday.com/ news/
nation/2005-07-09-army-weapons_x.htm?csp=34 (stating that the U.S.
military has analyzed the effects of ADS for decades, and has worked on
the current ADS system since 1994).

18.

Shane McGlaun, U.S. Military Demonstrates “Active Denial System”
Non-Lethal Weapon, DAILYTECH (Mar. 12, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://
www.dailytech.com/US+Military+Demonstrates+Active+Denial+Syste
m+NonLethal+Weapon+/article24208.htm.

19.

See Eytan Gilboa, The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication
Theory of International Relations, 22 POL. COMM. 27, 34–37 (analyzing
how various studies into the effect of media coverage of actions or
inactions demonstrate that the media may be able to influence tactical
decisions, such as the protection of certain threatened groups in the
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4. Costs and Logistics Demands are Excessive

Some NLW are, or soon can be, available as commercial off-theshelf products, so cost and prompt availability should not be major
problems. But even then, DoD still needs to adapt and improve the
tools to ensure that they are battlefield rugged and compatible with
other standard-issue equipment. That process can become costly,
especially when DoD is, admirably, committed to such thorough
human effects testing upon which other customers might not insist.20
Other, more path breaking NLW can be quite pricey. In a tight
budgetary environment, NLW research, development, and
procurement compete with pursuit of cyber, robotics, and other
innovations where the payoff seems quicker and more dramatic.
Moreover, the logistics tail of NLW may become an important
deterrent. If the military has to procure both NLW and its standard
complement of equipment, train its force on both categories of
weapons, store and transport both, and carry both into action, the
sum of all these support operations can be an impressive burden. It
might be that an infantryman on patrol encounters a particular
situation in which access to a specified NLW would be advantageous,
but how much weight and volume can he carry on that patrol? If he
has to pick only a limited quantity of items, he will naturally favor
the deadly tools and leave the NLW behind. 21

former Yugoslavia, but are less influential in determining the strategic
decisions of a country or coalition in a particular situation, such as in
Rwanda).
20.

Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Human Effects Characterization, DoD
Instruction 3200.19 (May 17, 2012), available at http://www. dtic.mil/
whs/directives/corres/pdf/320019p.pdf.

21.

Philip Bulman, Police Use of Force: The Impact of Less-Lethal
Weapons and Tactics, 267 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 4, 7–8. An additional
issue, which could in the future become an eleventh point for this
article’s list, is the danger that U.S. development and deployment of
advanced NLW might impede effective coalition operations, if allies (in
NATO or elsewhere) were not similarly equipped and trained. The
United States has addressed this potential issue by collaborating with
NATO allies in the pursuit of NLW, but it is not clear how vigorous
other countries have been in fielding the relevant capabilities. See, e.g.,
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate Participates in NATO NonLethal Weapons Experiment and Demonstration, U.S. DEF. DEP’T NONLETHAL WEAPONS PROG. (Mar. 8, 2011), http:// jnlwp. defense.gov/
PressRoom/MediaReleases/tabid/4778/Article/577945/joint-non-lethalweapons-directorate-participates-in-nato-non-lethal-weapons-ex.aspx
(describing the REAL DEAL experiments run by NATO to demonstrate
NLW developed by the JNLWD).
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5. International Law Impedes Use of Some NLW

Some emerging NLW technologies—acoustic wave systems and
ADS, for example—are designed to affect a large group of people
simultaneously. 22 The concept is to drive away or disable the faint of
heart, so that armed forces can identify the real, determined
troublemakers, separate them from the innocent onlookers, and deal
more forcefully with the actual threats. 23 However, the law of armed
conflict forbids targeting civilians, and it requires “distinction” by
treating non-combatants differently from belligerents. 24 The
application of wide-area, deliberately indiscriminate force fits
uncomfortably within the law.
Likewise, the application of chemical substances, such as riot
control agents or potential calmative agents, would be barred from
use in war by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, 25 and their
hypothetical use in “military operations other than war” has
appropriately been circumscribed as a prudential matter. The 1972
Biological Weapons Conventions even more comprehensively bars the
use of conceivable biological agents, such as microbes that could
attack enemy petroleum supplies or rubber tires and gaskets. 26 Most

22.

See, e.g., David Greig, The Long Range Acoustic Device: Pirate
Deterrent, Crowd Controller or Soft Drink Seller?, GIZMAG (Apr. 10,
2009), http://www.gizmag.com/lrad-long-range-acoustic-device/11433/
(describing a 2009 incident in which a cruise ship used a Long-Range
Acoustic Device, a device somewhat similar to ADS, to deter a Somali
pirate attack).

23.

See Lt. Col. Erik. L. Nutley, Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting Our Phasers
to Stun? Potential Strategic Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal
Weapons on the Battlefield 20 (Air War Coll. Ctr. for Strat. & Tech.
Occ. Paper 34, 2003), available at http:// www.au.af.mil/ au/awc/
awcgate/cst/csat34.pdf (discussing, inter alia, “concept exploration
programs” for non-lethal weapons systems that include the U.S. Army’s
“Crowd Control” system that can “dispers[e] a crowd at ranges up to
1,000 meters, and direc[t] a crowd[‘s] movement, separating belligerents,
and isolating specific individuals within a crowd.”).

24.

See Customary IHL—Practice Relating to Rule 1. The Principle of
Distinction between Civilians and Combatants, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS
[ICRC] (2015), https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/ v1_ rul_
rule1 (discussing the history and application of the principle of
distinction).

25.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art.
I(5), opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.

26.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction art. I(1), opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163.
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NLW occupy space unconstrained by these treaties, but the treaties
do bear upon some of the most intriguing possibilities. 27
6. NLW May Make Us Tactically Too Quick on the Trigger

Sometimes, the most appropriate weapon is no weapon at all.
Don’t just “do something”; stand there. Talk, smile, negotiate, walk
away, or just wait. By affording police or the military a less hostile
alternative to traditional firepower, NLW may encourage our forces to
act precipitously, when the wiser course of action might actually be
self-restraint. A telling example of the value of doing nothing is the
conspicuous precedent of the sheriff’s department of Orange County,
Fla. that equipped all of its officers with tasers. The first effect was an
expected and dramatic reduction in the frequency of the officers’ use
of deadly force. However, the second effect was an equally dramatic
increase in the incidence of use of force overall, suggesting that police
officers became quicker on the trigger when the adverse consequences
of shooting first, and asking questions later, were mitigated. 28
7. NLW May Make Us Strategically Too Prone to Foreign Interventions

At the senior political levels, the allure of NLW might lull
national leaders with an illusion of cheap, bloodless military
operations. They might be drawn into an engagement with the
expectation that NLW could allow the intervention to remain
entirely, or at least largely, safe and humane. In fact, however, any
such illusion cannot be sustained. NLW are not entirely non-lethal,29
and any military operation can cascade into a deadly confrontation
that the country might regret. In general, any time a new technology
promises to reduce the adverse consequences of a particular course of
action, the public should expect to see more exercise of that course of
action, even if it still turns out to be undesirable.
27.

See DoD Directive 3000.03E, supra note 2. An additional legal
consideration is the possibility that if NLW do work as well as
advertised, international and domestic U.S. law might eventually require
that those capabilities be exercised first in any confrontation, rather
than jumping immediately to the use of lethal force. U.S. policy denies
that thesis, asserting that the availability of NLW does not imply any
requirement to use them first, and does not raise the threshold for the
application of deadly force. Id., at ¶¶ 3(g), (h). But the law may
nonetheless evolve in that direction.

28.

See Alex Berenson, As Police Use of Tasers Soars, Questions Over
Safety Emerge, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 18, 2004), http:// www.nytimes.
com/2004/07/18/us/as-police-use-of-tasers-soars-questions-over-safetyemerge.html.

29.

Recognizing that no weapon can reliably be considered entirely nonlethal, the Department of Defense specifies that NLW are intended to
“minimize,” rather than to eliminate, fatalities and permanent injuries.
DoD Directive 3000.03E, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 2(a)(3), 3(e).
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8. Our Use of NLW May Embolden Opponents

When adversaries face the prospect of the U.S. military using
deadly force, they will be sensibly deterred from most confrontations.
If, however, they were confident that the worst consequences that
might befall them would be infliction of a bruise, nausea, or pain,
they may gain a reinforced will to resist. 30 No one would ever consider
the U.S. Marine Corps or domestic SWAT teams wimpy, even if fully
outfitted with NLW, but even a slight reputation for gentleness can
reduce the currently fearsome power of dissuasion.
9. NLW Technology Will Proliferate to Foreign Militaries and Be Used
Against Us

Wise military strategy has to contemplate not only the first move
(such as the U.S. adoption of various NLW), but the subsequent
moves as well, including the readily foreseeable adaptation by
opponents. If NLW are helpful in aiding U.S. forces in accomplishing
a mission, then other states may come to appreciate those virtues as
well, whether now or in the future. It is far from clear that a future
battlefield bristling on each side with both NLW and deadly weapons
would automatically work to the advantage of the United States. In
like manner, terrorists might become leading beneficiaries of a NLW
revolution. Imagine how the ability to seize and hold hostages or to
hijack aircraft could be augmented by some of the disabling
technologies now within reach.
10. NLW Technology Will Spread to Other Bad Actors

The nature of technology is to spread; NLW capabilities will
inevitably bleed into non-military sectors, probably sooner rather than
later. Already, street criminals have been drawn to stun guns and
pepper spray. 31 Imagine what they could do with commercially
available or black-market sticky foam or acoustic weapons. Another
invidious market would be human rights abusers, who could see a
knock-off ADS as a mechanism for inflicting excruciating pain upon
political dissidents or other disfavored groups, without leaving telltale
external scars that subsequent human rights monitors could detect
and document. 32
30.

Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Non-Lethal Weapons: The Potential and
the Pitfalls, 6 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 1, 5 (1990).

31.

See Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal
Weapons, and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62
STAN. L. REV. 199, 209.

32.

See PHYS. FOR HUM. RTS., WEAPONIZING TEAR GAS: BAHRAIN’S
UNPRECEDENTED USE OF TOXIC CHEMICAL AGENTS AGAINST CIVILIANS
25 (2012), available at https:// s3.amazonaws.com/ PHR_Reports/
Bahrain-TearGas-Aug2012-small.pdf (describing the weaponized use of
tear gas in Bahrain in 2012).
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III. Conclusion
Personally, I do not believe all these critiques. I think that there
are adequate, or at least partial, responses to each complaint.
However, NLW advocates should be careful not to over promise about
the suitability or performance of NLW. No weapon, or family of
weapons, is perfect or suitable for all types of engagements. At best,
NLW offers a set of alternative tools rather than a magic wand.
What should occur at this point is a more vigorous and better
funded pursuit of NLW, as well as more operation and application of
capabilities, such as ADS, in the field by military and police. The
Department of Defense should be more ambitious in exploring NLW
and bolder in fielding them. NLW deserve to be put more fully to the
test in actual field operations.
I hope that this red-team analysis, and the rebuttals and
counterarguments it may stimulate, will help advance the further
funding, development, and deployment of NLW in police situations
and armed conflicts.
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